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Most human actions are complex, but some of them are basic. Which are 
these? Here, I address the question by invoking slips, a common kind of 
mistake. The proposal is this: an action is basic for an agent if and only if the 
agent cannot slip in performing it.   
The argument presents some well-established results from 
psycholinguistics. These are generalized in the context of a philosophical 
theory of action. The guiding hypothesis is that speaking is a paradigmatic 
form of acting and, hence, thinking about speaking affords insights about 
human agency. The resulting criterion has the advantage of being easily 
operationalized: there are observable markers that guide its correct 
application. Thus, it gives an empirical standpoint for evaluating claims 
regarding basic actions.  
I begin by introducing the topic of basic actions and by briefly 
sketching the proposal. Then, I present the argument for it. I start with 
some observations regarding verbal slips, show how these observations 
extend to the non-verbal domain, and explain why general lessons about 
the structure of human actions can be inferred from them. With this 
understanding in hand, I discuss some widespread views on basic actions. 
First, I address some reasons for scepticism about their existence. Next, I 
examine the view that basic actions are those whose agents know basically 
how to do them. Finally, based on the present proposal, I criticize the 
widely held thesis that all basic actions occur within the limits of the 
agent’s body (i.e., basic actions as bodily movements). 
 
1. Basic actions 
 
Type a word in your computer. You are not God, who supposedly can do 
everything in one sweep. At the very least, you need to type each of the 
letters in it. Now compare typing a word with clenching a fist, or raising 
your arm (Danto 1965; Brand 1968). According to many theorists, the latter 
are some of your basic actions. You don’t need to do other actions as means 
to perform them. But by virtue of cobbling them up you manage to do 
other things. 
In thinking about actions, different senses of “basic” might be at 
issue. The focus here will be on teleological basicness (Hornsby 1980, 84; 
Ruben 2003, 66). In short, the idea is that because agents have a limited set 
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of skills and abilities, they normally face the problem of how to pool them 
together in order to achieve their desired results. Teleologically basic 
actions are those for which this kind of problem doesn’t arise. As an agent, 
one doesn’t have to figure out how, or by which means, to perform them.  
Many philosophers have argued that the structure of language 
parallels the structure of thought.1 Likewise, the means-end structure of 
action is a function of the structure of the agent’s mind. This is why 
identifying basic actions matters. To the extent that they are the building 
blocks of agency, their identification provides a window into the 
constituents of the psychology that makes human performances count as 
actions. Basic actions are the behavioural manifestations of the most 
primitive ways in which agents think about what they do. 
To illustrate, many action theorists believe there is a hierarchy of 
cognitive states that guide and control action. The hierarchy starts, at the 
top, with high-level representations such as general policies and large-scale 
intentions, and bottoms out with representations in charge of the fine 
details of motor control (Mele 1992, 220-223; Bermúdez 2000; Pacherie 2006; 
Butterfill & Singaglia 2014). Within this scheme, basic actions play an 
important role. Identifying them serves to distinguish the representations 
by which agents exert guidance and control from those by which sub-
personal mechanisms exercise control for them. Being the simplest kinds of 
behaviors that the agent directly guides, basic actions mark the lower 
bounds of agency. 
Aristotle famously held in this regard that deliberation had to stop 
somewhere (EN 1113a2). For him, the stopping point was the minor 
premise of the practical syllogism. The dictum is useful because it narrows 
down where to look for basic actions. But it doesn’t settle the matter. You 
might need to do something as a means to achieve something you intend 
and yet not deliberate about how to execute your intention. Skilled typists, 
say, don’t deliberate about how to type words or sentences. But typing a 
word or a sentence seems too “large” to count as basic for them.2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Classic, and very diverse, explanations for this kind of structural 
parallelism can be found in (Sellars 1956; Chomsky 1965; Davidson 1975; 
Fodor 1975).  
2 To be fair, Aristotle also recognized that skill can drive out deliberation. 
And, as discussed below, in some cases acquiring a skill renders some 
complex actions ultimately basic. But this is not always the case. The 
acquisition of a “high-level” skill might make it easier for an agent to 
cobble together basic actions, without changing what’s basic for her.  
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Arthur Danto, who introduced the topic to contemporary action 
theorists, claimed that every agent intuitively knows which are her basic 
actions (1965, 145). This was clearly a mistake. Even if agents have 
privileged knowledge of their actions, this privilege need not extend to the 
structure of their actions. An agent, therefore, might claim that she has the 
ability to do something basically and be wrong about it. Consider a parallel 
case. It might turn out that certain epistemologies are right and that some 
beliefs are basic in the sense of not originating from other beliefs. Yet, given 
that the origins of one’s beliefs are not always transparent, it wouldn’t 
follow that every thinker knows which beliefs are basic for him or her.  
Since Danto, various criteria for basic actions have been proposed. 
But the proposals have proven too controversial. Attempts to arrive at a 
criterion by induction from “intuitive” cases have been problematic 
because these intuitions hardly form a unified basis. Attempts to derive a 
solution from “first principles” quickly revert to long-standing debates 
about the nature of events, causation, etc., before any significant progress is 
made (for reviews of this discussion, see Baier 1971 and Sandis 2010). 
The criterion advanced here is meant to sidestep these problems. 
Being grounded on work in psycholinguistics, it offers an empirical 
standpoint to evaluate intuitions regarding basic actions. In addition, the 
criterion is neutral regarding the metaphysical positions that dominate the 
discussion.3 Metaphysicians, therefore, can adopt it as a naturalistic 
hypothesis while they make progress on the more abstract aspects of their 
accounts. 
 
2. The proposal 
 
The slip is a familiar kind of mistake. You set out to do something. But what 
you do by way of doing it is inappropriate, given what you intended and 
believed then. Think about spoonerisms. When Reverend Spooner spoke, 
language (not mere garble) came out of his mouth. The problem was that 
the things he said were usually in the wrong order.  
Spoonerisms are just one example. In fact, there are a whole variety 
of slips. Some of them are lexical, such as calling your partner by the name 
of your child. Others, as we shall see below, are non-verbal, and even non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Thus, I remain neutral in the discussion between unifiers (Anscombe 1963; 
Davidson 1971) and multipliers (Goldman 1970), regarding whether the 
accordion effect should be interpreted as containing one action under 
different descriptions or different actions. Thus, the present proposal can 
be rephrased in terms of actions being slip-proof under a description.   
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linguistic. All of them, however, exhibit the same general pattern. You mess 
up by doing (or not doing) some subordinate action in ways that are 
inappropriate in the light of your beliefs and of the overarching intention 
with which you act. 
Upon casual inspection, it would seem that slips are random 
malfunctions. But the truth is that they happen in well-defined patterns, 
shaped by the skills and abilities of each individual agent. One important 
consequence of this, as we shall see, is that not all actions allow for slips. 
For each agent there are some slip-proof actions: actions such that she 
cannot slip in doing them. The actions are slip-proof because the agent 
doesn’t need to do another action as means to perform them. Hence, there is 
no chance to mess up in the way characteristic of slips.   
Slip-proof actions are, in this regard, basic. Or so I shall propose. In 
the slip, the intended action is broken down into its constituents. So, if you 
cannot slip in doing some action, a reasonable hypothesis is that it has no 
constituents. It is, therefore, basic for you.  
 
3. Verbal slips 
 
Everyone makes slips. As a competent speaker, you intend to say one thing 
but wind up saying something else. It happens to Westerners and non-
Westerners, in spoken and signed languages, in ancient and modern times. 
Being a speaker, in short, is being a slipster.4  
The mistake comes in different guises. Some slips involve 
substitutions, such as calling someone by somebody else’s name. Others 
involve transpositions, for example, Spooner’s memorable, “Queer old 
Dean” (instead of Dear old Queen). And yet other slips involve omissions, 
as the Christian who asks God to “lead us into temptation.” The 
possibilities would seem endless. 
It would be a mistake, however, to think that verbal slips occur in 
random patterns. In fact, they are highly regular mistakes. Substitution 
slips, for instance, have lexical biases: you typically substitute intended 
words with real words. Further, the substituting words tend to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 In addition to English, slips have been studied in Arabic (Abd-El-Jawad et 
al. 1987), Dutch (Cohen 1966), French (Rossi et al. 1988), German (Meringer 
1908), Mandarin (Chen 1993), and Spanish (Viso et al. 1991). They have 
been documented in traditional tribes all over the world, including 
Indochina (Devereux 1957) and North America (Spier 1922), in signed 
languages (Klima and Bellugi 1979; Hohenberger et al. 2002) and among 
children and bilinguals (Jaeger 2005; Poulisse 1999).  
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semantically related and normally belong to the same syntactic category. 
As a consequence, most slips result in grammatically correct and 
meaningful utterances. 
Importantly, some slips never happen. As an English speaker, you 
might slip and talk about a “Freudian flip,” perseverating on the initial f. 
Hesitating whether to use “past” or “by,” you might announce that you 
will “drop py” a friend’s house. However, you will never be caught talking 
about a “Sreudian slip” (anticipating the s), or announcing that you will 
“drop bst” your friend’s house (blending the two words). There is a very 
intuitive explanation for this. Even though anticipations and blends are 
common, initial /sr/ and /bs/ are not phonetically permissible in English.5  
Psycholinguist Victoria Fromkin (1971; 1973) famously capitalized 
on these observations. Despite its fluent nature, she argued, speech is 
actually constituted by discrete linguistic units, which are sometimes 
substituted, transposed, or omitted. Some of them, like syntactic phrases or 
words, can be broken down, and some of their constituents re-arranged or 
altogether omitted. Others, in particular phonemic segments, are basic.  
At first glance, Fromkin’s argument would seem simply to establish 
the well-known conclusion that language can be analysed as having a 
recursive structure. But it goes deeper. It shows on the basis of behavioural 
data that speech acts are produced recursively from a set of atomic 
constituents. In speaking, as in language comprehension, there are 
psychologically real primitives.  
 
4. Speaking is acting 
 
Speaking is acting. Yet, judging by how seldom action theorists talk about 
speech, this would seem a forgotten truth. Arm raising might be pervasive. 
But it does not beat speaking in the run for being the paradigmatic case of 
agency.6   
Of course, there are differences between verbal and non-verbal 
action. Speaking, for instance, is regimented by constraints absent in other 
forms of acting, say, the syntax of the language. Also, although agents 
differ vastly in the skills they have, there is nothing in the non-linguistic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Philosopher and linguist Rulon Wells III was thus inspired to formulate 
his First Law of slips: “A slip of the tongue is practically always a 
phonetically possible noise” (1951, 86). For other formulations, see 
(Shattuck-Hufnagel 1983; Dell 1986; Meyer 1992). Dissenting voices are 
(Mowrey and McKay 1990) and (Pouplier 2004). 
6 Notable exceptions are (Searle 1983) and (Hornsby 2005). 
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domain quite like the division of speakers of different languages. Likely, 
there is no “action organ.”  
Nevertheless, there are deep similarities. In the non-verbal domain 
there are slips too. You intend to do something and act on that intention. 
Yet, without changing your mind, you wind up doing something else. It 
happens to everyone: the young and the old. It happens in all sorts of 
places. Sometimes, slips occur in unusual circumstances. But, for the most 
part, they happen in circumstances that have nothing out of the ordinary, 
where agents otherwise behave impeccably. Nonverbal slips are normal 
mistakes among competent agents.  
Actually, these slips reveal the same kind of structure that can be 
observed in their verbal counterparts. Some of them involve substitutions. 
You mess up a check in early January 2016 by dating it with January 2015. 
Others involve transpositions. Rushing to clear the breakfast table, you 
store the milk in the cupboard and the cereal in the fridge. Yet other slips 
involve omissions, as when one jumps into the shower with one’s glasses 
still on.7 
Like their verbal counterparts, non-verbal slips also show a 
significant degree of regularity. Obviously, regularity is not measured here 
by rule compliance, but by compliance with some of the agent’s know how 
or procedural knowledge. Slips are, in this regard, displays of misdirected 
competence, not signs of incompetence. They rarely result in clumsy 
movements; typically they result in actions that are part of the behavioural 
repertoire of their agents.  
Finally, rather than being brute accidents, slips are somewhat 
reasonable in the light of their over-arching intention. This is evidently true 
in cases of omissions: you do everything you intended except for one thing. 
But it also holds when the mistake involves a substitution or a 
transposition. To wit, writing January 2015 on the check was not 
completely off the mark. Storing the milk in the cupboard and the cereal in 
the fridge was one way to clear the breakfast table. 
 
5. Planning mistakes 
 
Consider a version of Wittgenstein’s question: What is left over if I subtract 
the fact that my words are spoken from the fact that I spoke my words? A 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For discussion of slips in everyday life and slip corpora, see (Amaya 2013; 
Jónsdóttir et al. 2007; Norman 1981; Reason and Mycielska 1982; Reason 
1984; Sellen 1990). 
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plausible answer is that after the subtraction at least two things are left: an 
intention to say something and a plan of how (or by which means) to say it.  
The answer is part of a widely accepted view of the nature of action. 
On it, an action is the execution of an intention guided by a plan (Brand 
1984; Mele and Moser 1994).8 The execution need not be successful. A failed 
murder attempt might still count as an action. Nor does the plan need to be 
thought out in advance. Even if many everyday actions are the result of 
intentions formed ahead of time, the plans to execute them tend to involve 
a significant amount of improvisation. Think about having a conversation. 
You might know ahead of time the gist of what you want to say. But in 
order to engage in real conversation, you will need to improvise along the 
way. 
In general, plans guide the execution of intentions by assembling 
subordinate actions into larger wholes. Thus, they give actions the means-
ends structure without which they would be mere sequences of doings 
(Ferrero 2009; Bratman 2010). In doing so, plans serve as solutions to 
various practical problems that agents normally face once they have 
adopted an intention. One of them is the problem of indeterminacy; there is 
often more than one open course of action to achieve a given goal. Another 
is the problem of serial ordering; achieving a goal often involves sequencing 
and coordinating several actions.  
Sometimes agents make mistakes solving these problems. 
Consequently, not all plans end up being properly aligned with the 
intentions they sub-serve. This is how slips come into existence. The plan 
that guides one’s execution winds up not being suitable to achieve what 
one intends, given one’s beliefs. It has an incorrect step, it has the right 
steps but laid out in an incorrect order, or it lacks one of them. Therefore, 
by acting on it, you wind up substituting, transposing or omitting one of 
the things you intended to do.  
These mistakes happen because, under certain circumstances, 
execution plans tend to be cognitively under-specified. Only a portion of the 
relevant information possessed by the agent at the time becomes active and 
is brought to bear (Reason 1992; Stemberger 1991a; Amaya in prep). It is 
easy to see why this might be the case. If you have too many things in mind 
or are acting under heavy time constraints, you might not be able to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The notion of plans adopted here comes from (Lashley 1951; Miller et al. 
1963). It differs somewhat from Bratman’s (1987) view of plans as 
structures for coordinating future-directed intentions. In the present sense, 
plans refer to structures for the execution of intentions but these need not 
concern actions in a distant future (Brand 1984; Pollock 1995).  
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deliberate about all the details of the intended performance. Instead, you 
might have to follow certain automatic routines to fill in the details.  
In the linguistic case, these routines are shaped by semantic and 
phonetic associations. This explains why slips involve words in the same 
semantic neighbourhood and utterances that sound very much alike. 
Similarly, in the non-linguistic domain, there are habits and well-rehearsed 
behavioural patterns, which is why slips look like competent performances. 
In general, both domains instantiate the same architectural feature of the 
human mind. In intention execution, exhaustive deliberation tends to be 
the exception. Automatic routines are the default rule.9 
The downside is that such routines are geared towards efficiency. 
For the most part, the resulting plans are adequate enough for agents to 
accomplish what they want to do without having to think too much. 
Semantic associations are a rough guide for lexical decision; habits a decent 
stand-in for deliberation. Occasionally, however, the circumstances of 
action are such that the result of relying on these rough-guides is behaviour 
that fails to be a good match for one’s intentions. Not being able to attend 
to all the aspects of one’s performance, the mistake goes unedited.  
 
6. Slip-proof 
 
Most everyday actions are complex: they are constituted by subordinate 
actions, orchestrated and assembled by plans. Therefore, their agents are 
susceptible to slip while performing them. Under the right circumstances, 
they can substitute, transpose, or omit one of its subordinate actions. This 
means if an action is planned the agent can slip in performing it. Or, put in 
the contra-positive, if an agent is not susceptible to slip, the action is not 
planned. 
On the other hand, if an action is not planned, it is basic. Basic 
actions are those that an agent does directly, not by virtue of doing 
anything else. So, when it comes to them, there is no difference between 
intending the action and being settled on how to do it. There is no need to 
select from various open courses of action, or to sequence subordinate 
actions. The action, qua action, does not have an internal structure.  
Thus, the criterion for basic actions follows. If the agent cannot slip, 
the action is not planned and, therefore, is basic for her. To be sure, the 
action can figure in an agent’s larger plan; basic actions are rarely done in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 For accounts of slips along these lines, developed independently of 
questions regarding basic actions, see (Norman and Shallice 1986; Reason 
1990; Baars 1992; Sellen and Norman 1992; Amaya in prep).  
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isolation.10 And the agent can slip performing some of the over-arching 
actions of that plan. Yet, in performing something that is basic, there won’t 
be a slip. Basic actions are slip-proof. 
Clearly, the parallel argument does not hold for other kinds of 
planning mistakes, say, those due to ignorance or irrationality. Whereas 
there are no restrictions on how wrong beliefs can be, or principled limits 
on the amount of irrationality a mind tolerates, there are observed 
limitations to the ways human agents slip.11 This, at least, is what the 
evidence from psycholinguistics indicates.  
Importantly, there is a rationale behind the evidence. One well-
known characteristic of cognitively under-specified processes is their 
tendency to default to contextually appropriate and well-rehearsed behaviours 
(Reason 1990, 1992; Amaya in prep).12 It is not surprising, then, that slips do 
not result in phonemically impermissible sounds. Articulating the 
phonemic segments of one’s language is among the most rehearsed actions 
there is. The rehearsal starts even before one becomes a speaker: around 
their tenth month, infants start babbling in the language of their 
community (de Bysson-Bardies et al. 1984; Stoel-Gammon 1985). 
Likewise, in the case of non-linguistic action, some action patterns 
are so well rehearsed that they seem apt candidates for being slip-proof. 
The adult stride is likely one of them. After years of practice, raising one’s 
foot as soon the other hits the ground becomes an action unit. You do not 
do it by virtue of doing any other action. Nor do you need to solve the 
problem of how to do it. Thus, you might slip and walk to the fridge when 
you intended to walk to the cupboard to fetch a snack. Or you might slip 
and try to walk, having “forgotten” that your foot is actually immobilized. 
But you will not slip by not alternating your stride. Walking, in this sense, 
is likely slip-proof.13  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 An action can be part of a plan without requiring from the agent further 
planning. This would be the case if the action is a constituent of a larger 
whole, but its execution does not require guiding and orchestrating further 
subordinate actions.  
11 Normative principles, such as the principle of charity, might provide 
some limits. But the limitations apply to patterns of actions or belief 
systems, not to individual actions or beliefs. 
12 In lexical slips, for instance, more frequent elements are less likely to be 
affected by error, and less frequent elements tend to be replaced by more 
frequent ones (Dell 1990; Stemberger 1991b). 
13 Of course, walking for a given distance is not basic; it is a complex action 
made up of a repetition of tokens of a basic action unit, the alternating 
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Obviously, there is another (non-technical) sense in which walking 
is not slip-proof. If the floor is wet, or if the last cocktail hit you too hard, 
you might literally slip and fall. Internal or external conditions might 
genuinely prevent an agent from exercising her basic competences and 
skills. Similarly, speakers of a language might come to violate the 
phonemic constraints of their language, say, if they are extremely tired, 
having an epileptic attack, or if asked to repeat very quickly a string of 
nonsense syllables (Mowrey and McKay 1990; Pouplier 2003).  But this is as 
it should be. Under normal conditions, basic actions, like basic beliefs, are 
protected from certain kinds of mistakes. But they need not be protected 
against all sorts of failures.  
What is true of uttering the phonemes of one’s language or the 
alternated stride might also be true about fist clenching and other common 
examples. Or maybe not. One of the advantages of the criterion is that it 
can be operationalized, which means that both naturalistic and controlled 
observation can help decide the results of applying it in different cases. 
Behaviourally speaking, slips are actions that their agents quickly recognize 
as falling short of what they intended. The recognition is typically 
accompanied by surprise. And the mistake can easily be corrected upon 
being noticed (Baars 1992; Poulisse 1999, ch. 2).  
 
7. Scepticism  
 
Given that actions theorists tend to countenance basic actions, an existence 
proof would seem unnecessary. Yet, Michael Thompson (2008, 107-112) 
denies their existence on the grounds that every action can be indefinitely 
divided and that each of its parts, being a means for the more complex 
action, qualifies as an action in and of itself. Imagine an agent moving from 
point A to point C. Because the action takes time and occurs in space, 
Thompson argues, it could be divided into the movement from A to B and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
stride. Experiments with split-belt treadmills provide further evidence that 
the stride pattern is a non-breakable unit (Reisman et al. 2005; Choi & 
Bastian 2007). In them, human subjects have been show to adapt to 
different patterns of locomotion, including moving each of the legs at 
different speeds and even different directions. Upon returning to normal 
conditions, subjects tend to show adaptation after-effects: limping, uneven 
stride times, etc. However, they always maintain the one-to-one stepping 
pattern (alternating steps with support periods and no airborne periods) 
characteristic of everyday walking 
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from B to C, where each of these movings is a means for the larger action 
and, hence, itself an action. In so far as this kind of process of division can 
be iterated indefinitely, he concludes, there are no basic actions.  
The argument, however, does not go through. It is, perhaps, true 
that every action can be indefinitely divided in the way in which 
Thompson envisions. Yet, from the fact that an action can be thus divided, 
it does not follow that it is so divided. Moving from A to B and from B to C 
could each be means for moving from A to C. But they need not be. There 
could be an agent for whom, because of her skills or training, the latter has 
become an action unit. In moving from A to C, she would obviously move 
through B. But for her the latter would not be a means for moving from A to 
C. 
Consider again the case of speech production. Uttering a phoneme 
in any language is evidently an action with parts: moving one’s tongue, 
letting air out in coordination with the vibration of the chords, etc. In turn, 
these parts can be subdivided: the tongue is moved, say, beginning far 
away from the roof of the mouth to the soft palate to pronounce the 
German name Bach. Now, as anyone who has learned a new language late 
in life knows, one sometimes needs to do some of these things as means to 
pronounce new phonemes.  
The situation of competent speakers, however, is very much unlike 
this.14 Although one could take these steps, in fluent speech one does not 
need to do it. At least, this is what the evidence from psycholinguistics 
reviewed here would seem to indicate. Speakers do not slip in uttering 
phonemes of their language, because for them uttering each of them is an 
action unit. From their perspective as fluent speakers, there are no means 
by which they utter them. 15   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Of course, as a competent speaker, one might also break down the 
uttering of phonemes into smaller actions, say, if one is trying to teach 
someone else the pronunciation one already masters. But, again, this does 
not show that uttering phonemes in fluent speech is not basic for the 
speaker. It just shows that there are alternative (non-basic) ways for her to 
utter phonemes. 
15 It is hard to say how exactly the proposed criterion would work out in 
Thompson’s example, given how schematic the latter is. But, in rough, the 
idea would be that if moving from A to C were basic, one would not 
observe the mover slip, say, by moving from A to B* instead of A to B. Of 
course, the agent could move through B* out of clumsiness, but that’s a 
different kind of failure. 
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The point can be put in a slightly different way. If an action is basic 
then, as far as the agent is concerned, there is no further action she needs to 
perform as a means. Thompson, however, objects that in the process of 
dividing the action of moving from A to C no minimum sensibile (his 
terminology) can be found: no point at which the division ceases to reflect 
how the agent structures her action by means of smaller actions. There is 
no such point or, if there is one, its location can only be arbitrarily settled. 
Either way, scepticism about basic actions ensues.  
However, as we have seen in the process of dividing speech acts 
into their constituent parts, there seems to be a natural stopping point, 
which slips help to mark. Under normal conditions, competent speakers do 
not slip in assembling individual phonemes out of the possible sounds they 
can otherwise voice. Due to years of intense rehearsal, they do not face the 
problem of figuring out how to cobble together articulatory movements 
into those phonemes and, hence, they do not make the corresponding 
planning mistakes. In contrast, when they face the problem of assembling 
phonemes into larger wholes, there is the possibility of slipping. At supra-
phonemic levels, speakers regularly substitute, transpose, or omit parts of 
the intended utterance.  
 
8. Practical knowledge 
 
Many theorists appeal to the agent’s practical knowledge to determine 
which parts of her actions can genuinely be regarded as means to perform 
them. Thus, they count as basic those actions such that their agents’ 
knowledge of how to do them (more precisely, their exercise of that 
knowledge at the time) is basic. According to this view, knowing how to do 
an action is basic if it does not depend on the agent’s knowing how to do 
some other action (Goldman 1970; Enc 2003; Hornsby 2005; Smith 2010).  
In a way, this is compatible with what I have been arguing so far. 
Slip-proof actions are normally represented by the agent in a plan for an 
over-arching action but they are never the object of further planning. So, if 
knowing in a basic way how to do an action is knowledge without a further 
plan, the proposals would seem to agree.  
The problem with the knowledge criterion is that it is unclear how 
to identify when a piece of knowledge is in fact basic and, thus, when the 
criterion is legitimately applied. To illustrate, consider an argument by 
Jennifer Hornsby (2005). According to her, and contrary to what I have 
been urging here, voicing your thoughts in a sentence is normally basic for 
speakers. To do it, you do not need to exercise knowledge regarding how 
the vehicles that express those thoughts go together. Instead, once you 
 
 
 13	  
know what thoughts you want to voice, sub-personal mechanisms select 
and assemble the vehicles by which those thoughts are expressed.  
To argue for this, Hornsby appeals to what speakers seem to tacitly 
know without observation, as opposed to what they come to know by 
listening to themselves speak.16 In fact, her argument is a modus tollens on 
the following conditional: “If the speaker did exercise procedural 
knowledge of how to voice her thoughts, then, even if the procedure were 
something of which she was not explicitly aware, she would be in a 
position to know of it ‘without observation’ as she spoke (Hornsby 2005, 
121).” 
According to Hornsby, the phenomenology of everyday speech 
shows that the consequent of the conditional does not hold. So, she denies 
the antecedent and concludes that voicing one’s thoughts in a sentence is 
basic. For her, a speaker who becomes aware of the vehicles of her 
utterances does not do it attending to something already known by her 
without observation (Hornsby 2005, 122-123). If she does it at all, she does 
it in the capacity of listener of her own speech, for example, noticing ex-
post that she has said the wrong word, that her utterance was 
ungrammatical, etc. 
There is evidence, however, that Hornsby is mistaken about this—
more cautiously, that the phenomenological evidence she invokes might be 
misleading. One recurrent observation in naturalistic and controlled 
settings is that slips can actually be corrected before they happen, even 
before there is a motor manifestation of them. In the literature, these are 
known as micro-slips: slips corrected early enough in their development 
not to count as mistakes (Reed and Schoenherr 1992). Sometimes speakers 
report micro-slips: you catch yourself about to say the wrong word, or 
about to make a Spoonerism. But they too can be inferred from overt 
corrections that seem to be anticipations of the slip.  
Micro-slips are evidence to countenance non-perceptual editing 
exercises, even at sub-sentential levels, that operate prior to processes 
involved in phonation and voicing (Laver 1973; Motely et al. 1981; MacKay 
1987; Wheeldon and Levelt 1995; Postma 2000). Further, the existence of 
such exercises is evidence that, contrary to what Hornsby argues, voicing 
your thoughts in a sentence is not basic, at least not according to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For the notion of knowledge without observation, I follow Hornsby: “if 
she (the agent) were to attend to, or to reflect upon, what she is doing, then 
it is something she could find herself doing, and in finding herself doing it, 
she would not need to make observations of the sort that a spectator might 
make.” (2005, 121).  
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criterion proposed here.  Awareness of the micro-slip normally involves an 
exercise of procedural knowledge at the level of the vehicles of those 
thoughts. Or, in the terms used earlier, it involves a plan in which the 
agent, and not merely some sub-personal mechanism within her, represents 
the utterings of elements of the sentence as such. 
Obviously, Hornsby’s is not the only knowledge-based criterion for 
basic actions. But her proposal illustrates a crucial problem that such 
accounts are likely to face. If one wishes to sort out which actions are basic 
by appealing to the criterion that one’s knowledge of how to do them is 
basic, one better have a way of determining when knowledge is basic. 
Here, as in other cognitive domains, first-person reports and appeals to 
phenomenology can be highly misleading.  
In contrast, because the detection of slips can be operationalized, 
the present proposal has the resources to accommodate the problem. Slips, 
it has been argued, mark the joints of plans, in particular, they serve to 
signal the lower bounds of the agent’s planning. Thus, to the extent that 
basic knowledge and basic planning coincide, the empirical criterion 
offered here actually serves double duty, helping to identify instances of 
basic knowledge. In short, basic knowledge is procedural knowledge of 
how to perform slip-proof actions. 
 
9. Bodily movements 
 
Among action theorists, it is common to suppose that basic actions (except, 
perhaps, in cases of pure omissions and mental actions) are restricted to 
bodily movements. Some theorists think that, in so far as exercises of 
agency involve a person causing an event, actions are those events caused 
(Davidson 1971; Smith 2010). Others insist that actions, rather than being 
events, are the causings of those events (Hornsby 1980; Dretske 1988). 
Accordingly, some claim that basic actions are bodily motions; others claim 
that they are causings of bodily motions.  
Regardless, the essential contrast intended here is between moving 
one’s body and the effects the resulting motions have beyond the surface of 
one’s skin. And the point of the contrast is to isolate the contribution of the 
agent from the contribution that the world, so to speak, makes. Isolating 
the former is a way of picking out basic actions. The latter are supposed to 
occur within the limits of one’s skin. 
Given what has been said so far, I would seem to agree. Having 
insisted upon speaking as a paradigmatic case of agency seems to invite 
one to locate the search for basic actions within the bounds of the skin. For 
one thing, speaking is done with your body without contributions of the 
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world other than those that allow for bodily control. For another thing, 
uttering phonemes in one’s language seems to be a good example of what it 
would be for an action to be just the moving of one’s body. 
It would be a mistake, however, to restrict slip-proof actions in 
general to bodily movements. Simply put, the generalization is not 
empirically supported. Whereas the restriction holds in the verbal domain, 
in some non-verbal instances, the evidence seems to indicate that what is 
basic (that is, slip-proof) for an agent goes beyond the limits of her body. 
To see this, consider skilled typists. As it has been observed, typing 
slips among experts (typos) always involve the wrong key being struck by 
a finger appropriate to that key. Most often they involve hitting the key 
horizontally or vertically adjacent to the intended one: typing miatake or 
mixtake, instead of mistake. Less often, but also common, they consist of 
homologous finger substitutions: typing d instead of k (Lessenberry 1928; 
Rosenbaum 2010, ch.9). 
One kind of mistake not observed, however, is finger-to-key 
confusions. That is, if you are an expert (roughly, if you do not hunt-and-
peck) and make a typo by hitting w instead of e, you would not hit the w 
with your middle finger. You would do it rather with your ring finger. Due 
to years of practice each key becomes associated with one particular finger. 
So, having figured out which key to hit, you do not face the additional 
problem of deciding which finger to use.17  
These observations show, in the first place, that typos do not occur 
as common sense has it. It is not as though the finger is moved too far to 
the left or the right, too high or low. Rather, the mistake occurs at the level 
of key selection. Yet, more important, the observations provide good 
evidence that keystrokes are for skilled typists what phonemic segments 
are for competent speakers. One substitutes, transposes, or omits them, but 
one doesn’t normally err in producing them, say, by confusing which key 
goes with which finger. The evidence indicates, in other words, that what is 
basic for skilled typists are not finger movements but keystrokes.  
It would be surprising if typing were the exception. It is well known 
that with repeated use tools become “transparent” to their users--extended 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Grudin (1983) was the first to report this observation, which played a 
major role in re-conceptualizing computational models of typing and 
validating existing ones (e.g. Rumelhart and Norman 1982) that assume 
finger movements to be circumscribed by the keys associated with each 
finger. 
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cognition theorists have provided various examples.18 And it might turn out 
that using the tool, not moving one’s body in such-and-such way, is what’s 
basic in some of these cases. Think about moving the cursor in your screen. 
Or consider people who regularly use prosthetic limbs or other extensions 
of their body. After a period of adaptation, for instance, leg amputees 
report having to consciously think about the position of their limbs before 
getting up, yet once in motion being able to “just walk.”19 
 
10. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I’ve put forward a criterion for identifying basic actions. The 
criterion generalizes results from psycholinguistics in the context of a 
philosophical theory of action. In addition, it helps defuse scepticism about 
basic actions, illuminates discussion of basic knowledge, and shows why it 
might be a mistake to restrict the search for basic actions within the limits 
of the agent’s body. Overall, the proposal illustrates how much it can be 
gained by thinking systematically about certain everyday mistakes and by 
taking seriously the idea that speaking is a paradigmatic way of acting. 20  
 
References 
Abd-El-Jawad, H., & Abu-Salim, I. (1987) Slips of the tongue in arabic and 
their theoretical implications. Language Sciences Language Sciences, 
9(2), 145-171. 
Amaya, S. (2013) Slips. Noûs, 47, 559-576.  
Amaya, S. (in prep). Without belief. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The terminology of tools being transparent comes from (Norman 1999). 
For discussion in relation to extended cognition, see (Clark 2008).  
19 For discussions of adaptations to prosthetic limbs, see (Fraser 1984 and 
(Murray 2004, 968). For adaptation in laparoscopic interventions by expert 
surgeons, see (Verwey et al. 2005; Wilson et al. 2010).  
20 Versions of this paper were presented at the Time and Agency conference 
at George Washington University in November 2011 and at the 2013 Pacific 
Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. I would like 
to thank Roman Altshuler, Andrei Buckareff, Valentina Cuccio, Kim Frost, 
Luca Ferrero, Steven Gross, John Heil, Kirk Ludwig, Michael Pauen, 
Michael Sigrist, Roy Sorensen, David Velleman, Eric Wiland, and Jeff Zacks 
for insightful comments and helpful discussion.     
 
 
 17	  
Anscombe, G.E.M. (1963) Intention. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Baars, B. (1992) The many uses of error: Twelve steps to a unified 
framework In B. Baars (Ed.), Experimental slips and human error (pp. 
3-37). New York: Plenum Press.  
Baier, A. (1971) The search for basic actions. American Philosophical 
Quarterly, 8(2), 161-170.  
Bermúdez, J.L. (2000). Personal and subpersonal: a difference without a 
distinction. Philosophical Explorations, 3, 63-82. 
Butterfill, S., Sinigaglia, C. (2014) Intention and motor representation in 
purposive action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88, 119-
145. 
Brand, M. (1968) Danto on basic actions. Nous, 2, 187-190. 
Brand, M. (1984) Intending and acting: Toward a naturalized action theory. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Bratman, M. (2010) Agency, time, and sociality. Proceedings of the 
American Philosophical Association, 84(2), 7-26.  
Bratman, M. (1987) Intention, plans, and practical reason. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.  
Chen, J. (1993) A corpus of speech errors in mandarin chinese and their 
classification. The World of Chinese Language, 69, 26-41.  
Chomsky, N. (1965) Aspects of a theory of syntax. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Choi, J. and Bastian, A. (2007) Adaptation reveals independent control 
networks for walking. Nature Neuroscience, 10, 1055-1062. 
Clark. A. (2008) Supersizing the mind: embodiment, action, and cognitive 
extension. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cohen, A. (1966) Errors of speech and their implication for understanding 
the strategy of language users. Zeitschrift Für Phonetik, 21, 177-181.  
 
 
 18 
Danto, A. C. (1965) Basic Actions. American Philosophical Quarterly, 2(2), 
141-148.  
Davidson, D. (1971) Agency. Essays on actions and events (pp. 43-61). 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
Davidson, D. (1975). Thought and talk. In In S. Guttenplan (ed) Mind and 
Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
De Boysson-Bardies B, Sagart L, & Durand C. (1984) Discernible differences 
in the babbling of infants according to target language. Journal of Child 
Language, 11(1), 1-15.  
Dell, G. S. (1986) A spreading-activation theory of retrieval in sentence 
production. Psychological Review, 93(3), 283-321.  
Dell. G. S. (1990) Effects on frequency and vocabulary type on phonological 
speech errors. Language and Cognitive Processes, 5, 313-349  
Devereux, G. (1957) A primitive slip of the tongue. Anthropological 
Quarterly, 30(1), 27-29.  
Dretske, F. (1988) Explaining behavior: Reasons in a world of causes. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Dummett, M. (1975) What is a theory of meaning? In S. Guttenplan (ed) 
Mind and Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Enc, B. (2003) How we act: Causes, reasons, and intentions. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.  
Evans, G. & McDowell, J. (1976) Introduction. Essays in Semantics. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Ferrero, L. (2009) What good is a diachronic will? Philosophical Studies, 
144(3), 403-430.  
Fodor, J. (1975) The language of thought. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
Fraser, C. (1984) Does an artificial limb become part of the user? The British 
Journal of Occupational Therapy, 47, 43-45.  
 
 
 19	  
Fromkin, V. (1973) Introduction. In V. Fromkin (Ed.), Speech errors as 
linguistic evidence (pp. 11-45). The Hague: Mouton.  
Fromkin, V. (1971) The non-anomalous nature of anomalous utterance. 
language. Language, 47, 27-52.  
Goldman, A. (1970) A theory of human action. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall.  
Grudin, J. (1983) Error patterns in novels and skilled typists. In W. E. 
Cooper (Ed.), Cognitive aspects of skilled typewriting (pp. 121-143). 
New York: Springer Verlag.  
Hohenberger, A., Happ, D., & Leuninger, D. (2002) Modality-dependent 
aspects of sign language production: Evidence from slips of the hands 
and their repairs in german sign language. In R. Meier, K. Cormier & D. 
Quinto-Pozos (Eds.), Modality and structure in signed and spoken 
languages. (pp. 112-142). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.  
Hornsby, J. (2005) Semantic knowledge and practical knowledge. 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 79, 107-130.  
Hornsby, J. (1980) Actions. London: Routledge and Kegan. 
Jaeger, J. (2005) Kid's slips: What young children's slips of the tongue reveal 
about language development. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.  
Jónsdóttir, M., Adólfsdóttir, S., Cortez, R. D., Gunnarsdóttir, M., & 
Gústafsdóttir, H. (2007). A diary study of action slips in healthy 
individuals. The Clinical Neuropsychologist, 21(6), 875-883.  
Klima, E., & Bellugi, U. (1979) The signs of language. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.  
Lashley, K. S. (1951) The problem of serial order in behavior. In. L. Jeffress 
(ed) Cerebral Mechanisms in Behavior, New York: John Wiley & Sons.  
Laver, J. (1973). The detection and correction of slips of the tongue. In V. 
Fromkin (ed.) Speech errors as linguistic evidence. The Hague: Mouton.   
Lessenberry, D. (1928) Analysis of errors. Syracuse, NY: L.C. Smith and 
Corona Typewriters.  
 
 
 20 
MacKay, D. G. (1987) The organization of perception and action: A theory 
for language and other cognitive skills. New York: Springer-Verlag.  
Mattson, M., & Baars, B. (1992) Laboratoy induction of nonspeech errors. In 
B. Baars (Ed.), Experimental slips and human error (pp. 151-193). New 
York: Plenum Press.  
Mele, A. (1992) Springs of Action. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Mele, A. R., & Moser, P. K. (1994) Intentional action. Nous, 28(1), 39-68.  
Meringer, R. (1908) Aus dem Leben der Sprache. Berlin: B. Behr's Verlag.  
Meyer AS. (1992) Investigation of phonological encoding through speech 
error analyses: Achievements, limitations, and alternatives. Cognition, 
42(1-3), 1-3.  
Miller, G., Galanter, E. & Pribram, K. (1963) Plans and the structure of 
behavior. New York: Holt, Reinherdt & Winston. 
Motley, M., Baars, B., & Camden, T. (1981) Syntactic criteria in 
prearticulatory editing: Evidence from laboratory induced slips of the 
tongue. Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 10, 503-522.  
Mowrey, R., & MacKay, I. (1990) Phonological primitives: 
Electromyographic speech error evidence. The Journal of the Acoustical 
Society of America, 88(3), 1299-312.  
Murray, C. (2004) An interpretative phenomenological analysis of the 
embodiment of artificial limbs. Disability and Rehabilitation, 26(16), 
963-973. 
Norman, D., Shallice, T. (1986) Attention to action. In R. Davidson, G. 
Schwartz and D. Shapiro (Eds.), Consciousness and self-regulation (pp. 
1-18). New York: Plenum Press.  
Norman, D. (1999) The invisible computer. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Norman, D. (1981) Categorization of action slips. Psychological Review, 88, 
1-15.  
 
 
 21	  
Pacherie, E. (2006) Towards a dynamic theory of intentions. In S. Pockett, 
W.P. Banks and S. Gallagher (eds.) Does Consciousness Cause 
Behavior? Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 145-167 
Pollock, J. L. (1995) Cognitive carpentry a blueprint for how to build a 
person. Cambridge: MIT Press.  
Postma, A. (2000) Detection of errors during speech production: a review of 
speech monitoring models. Cognition, 77, 97-131. 
Poulisse, N. (1999) Slips of the tongue: Speech errors in first and second 
language production. Amsterdam: Benjamins.  
Pouplier, M. (2004) Units of phonological encoding empirical evidence. 
Thesis (Ph. D), Yale University.  
Reason, J. (1984) Lapses of attention in everyday life. In R. Parasuraman, & 
D. Davies (Eds.), Varieties of attention (pp. 515-549). New York: 
Academic Press.  
Reason, J. (1992) Cognitive underspecification: Its variety and 
consequences. In B. Baars (Ed.), Experimental slips and human error 
(pp. 71-91). New York: Plenum Press.  
Reason, J., & Mycielska, K. (1982) Absent-minded? the psychology of 
mental lapses and everyday errors. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall.  
Reason, J. (1990) Human error. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Reed, E., & Schoenherr, D. (1992) The neuropathology of everyday life: On 
the nature and significance of microslips in everyday life. Unpublished 
Manuscript. 
Reisman, D., Block, H., Bastian, A. (2005) Interlimb coordination during 
locomotion: what can be adapted and stored? Journal of 
Neurophysiology, 94, 2403-2415. 
Rosenbaum, D. A. (2010) Human motor control. Amsterdam; Boston: 
Elsevier. 
 
 
 22 
Rossi, M., & Peter-Defare, E. (1998) Les lapsus: Ou comment notre fourche 
a langué. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.  
Ruben, D. H. (2003) Action and Its Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Rumelhart, D. & Norman, D. (1982) Simulating a skilled typist: a study of 
skilled cognitive-motor performance. Cognitive Science, 6, 1-36.  
Sandis, C. (2010) Basic actions and individuation. In T. O'Connor, & C. 
Sandis (Eds.), A companion to the philosophy of action (pp. 10-17). 
Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.  
Searle, J. (1983) Intentionality : An essay in the philosophy of mind. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sellars, W (1956) Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Minnesota Studies 
in the Philosophy of Science, 1, 253–329. 
Sellen, A. J. (1990) Mechanisms of human error and human error detection. 
Thesis (Ph.D), University of California San Diego.  
Sellen, A., & Norman, D. (1992) The psychology of slips. In B. Baars (Ed.), 
Experimental slips and human error (pp. 317-339). New York: Plenum 
Press. 
Shattuck-Hufnagel, S. (1983) Sublexical units and suprasegmental structure 
in speech production planning. In P. MacNeilage (Ed.), The production 
of speech (pp. 109-136). New York: Springer.  
Smith, M. (2010) The standard story of action: An exchange (1). In J. 
Aguilar, & A. Buckareff (Eds.), New perspectives on the causal theory 
of action (pp. 45-55). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Spier, L. (1922) Havasupai days. In E. Parsons (Ed.), American indian life (). 
New York: Huebsch.  
Stemberger, J. (1991b) Apparent anti-frequency effects in language 
production: The addition bias and phonological underspecification. 
Journal of Memory and Language, 30(2), 161-185.  
 
 
 23	  
Stemberger, J. (1991a) Radical underspecification in language production. 
Phonology, 8(1), 73-112.  
Stoel-Gammon C. (1985) Phonetic inventories, 15-24 months: A 
longitudinal study. Journal of Speech and Hearing Research, 28(4), 505-
12.  
Thompson, M. 2008. Life and Action. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
Verwey, W., Stroomer, S., Lammens, R., Schulz, S., & Ehrenstein, W. (2005) 
Comparing endoscopic systems on two simulated tasks. Ergonomics, 
48(3), 270-287.  
Viso, S., Igoa, J., & García-Albea, J. (1991) On the autonomy of phonological 
encoding: Evidence from slips of the tongue in spanish. Journal of 
Psycholinguistic Research, 20(3), 161-185. 
Wheeldon, L. & Levelt, W. (1994) Monitoring the time course of 
phonological encoding. Journal of Memory and Language, 34, 311-334. 
 Wilson, M., Vine, S., McGrath, J., Brewer, J., Defriend, D., & Masters, R. 
(2010) Psychomotor control in a virtual laparoscopic surgery training 
environment: Gaze control parameters differentiate novices from 
experts. Surgical Endoscopy and Other Interventional Techniques, 
24(10), 2458-2464.  
Wells, R. (1951) Predicting slips of the tongue. The Yale Scientific 
Magazine, 26, 9-30.  
 
